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Unfortunately though, the Plame affair was far from a fictitious paranoia ridden screenplay; And as history trudges on it will forever be a shadow looming over the legacy of the Bush administration and the damaging ramifications it placed on the public perception of the Central Intelligence Agency. Published in 2007, Plame's autobiography, Fair Game, provides insight into events surrounding her out as an undercover CIA agent, its impact, and the twenty years of service she devoted to the CIA. This review will begin with a brief synopsis of Fair Game, discussing the unfolding of events that led to Plame's outpacing, and highlight some of the issues within the Central Intelligence Agency as pointed out by Plame through her twenty year career.

Published in October 2007, Fair Game is an account of Valerie Plame's twenty year tenure at the Central Intelligence Agency and the events that led up to and followed the leak of her name by Washington Post reporter Robert Novak in July 2003. As an employee of the CIA, before Plame could publish her book, she had to submit all her writings to the CIA Publications Review Board (PRB), to make sure she was not releasing any classified information. There are significant portions of Fair Game blacked out that the CIA redacted but as the reader finds out later on towards the end of the book, much of that information had already been declassified and was in the public sphere. Since, much of the blacked out portions of the book were already declassified, there is an afterword by Laura Rozen that fills the missing pieces of information.

When Valerie Plame first joined the Agency in 1985, under CIA director William Casey, it was in the midst of rapid growth and exciting transformation. Casey, who, 'to this day many in the Agency consider the best director the Agency has ever had', began the Career Trainee program, an elite program into which Plame was accepted. The program was a rigorous training program that coupled intensive academic teachings of the Agency's ways, government and political systems, and veterinary physical training at the "Farm". In the first chapter, Plame begins with her experience at the "Farm", which included paramilitary-style operational training and corps-building. With such exercises as trudging through woods and swamps carrying eighty pound book bags at 4 am, jumping out of helicopters, evading potential captors, and simulated situations of being captured and held captive, it is obvious the CIA went to great lengths in training their recruitments And sifting out the weaklings. After successfully graduating from the trainee program, Plame got her first assignment as a CIA case officer in Athens, Greece in 1989. Having had official cover while in Greece, she worked by day as a junior political officer at the US Embassy.

It was during the after-hours where Plame carried out her work as a covert operations officer. While in Greece, she was assigned to the internal political developments, and much of her work focused on the Marxist terrorist group 17 November (N17), which had been responsible for over 100 attacks and 23 assassinations, one which included the Athens CIA Station Chief Richard Welch in 1975. As an operations officer, it was Plame's duty to seek out potential recruits, establish connections, maintain relations, and decide whether or not they would be a valuable source of information for the Agency. Essentially, she spent her years in Greece recruiting spies that could provide valuable inside information on N17. By 1992, Plame returned back to Washington after the N17 had been taken down by local Greek authorities. Between the years of 1992 and 1996, Plame worked as a Nonofficial Coffered Officer (NOC) in Brussels. Plame sent only a year as a NOC, because the prior years were devoted to academic training to distance itself from the US Government. By 1997, she was called back to headquarters to work in the newly created Couterproliferation Division (CPD) in the Director of Operations (DO). It was also that year, that Plame would meet future husband, Former US Ambassador to Gabon, Joseph C. Wilson IV. By 1998, the couple married and settled in Washington, DC

The CPD that Plame joined in 1998 was 'devoted to obtaining intelligence and thwarting nuclear acquisitions efforts of rogue nations and nonstate actors'. One of the main objectives and greatest successes of the CPD during this time was the take down of AQ Khan in 2003. Khan, a Pakistani, had over the years set up a large nuclear black market network. After giving birth to her twins, Plame took a year off work before returning to the agency full time in April 2001. Upon her return, 'Valerie Wilson was one of two CIA operations officers assigned to work in the Iraq branch of the CPD'. After the events of September 11th occurred, it was not long before the war drums began slowly beating in the distance. It was also during this time that the trickle of politics began to slowly see into the agency. According to Plame, the Agency began the investigation into the yellowcake uranium from Niger shortly after an officer came to her office saying that she had just gotten off the phone with a waiter from the office of the Vice President. The officer had spoken with the waiter after they had received an intelligence report transmitted on from the Italian government.

The report "alleged in 1999 Iraq had bought yellowcake uranium. .. from Niger." The waiter stated the officer that the Vice President wanted more information on the claim. When this officer came to Plame, saying that she had just received a phone call From a waiter working in the Vice President's office she was momentarily perplexed. "As Plame noted, 'in my experience, I had never known that to happen. There were strict protocols and procedures for funneling intelligence to policy makers or fielding their questions.' Plame Brushed it away and went to work, 'unaware of the unpractedented number of visits the vice president had made to Headquarters to meet with analysts and look for an available evidence to support the Iraq WMD claims the administration was beginning to make'. Employees on how to investigate the Niger claims, Plame and her colleagues worked diligently trying to come up with the best options.

It was during this time that Plame's husband, Joseph Wilson, was brought up as someone who could assist the agency in investigating the Niger claims. Later later reports, it was not Plame herself who had recommended Joe for the mission but a midlevel reports officer, 'who knew of Joe's history and role in the first Gulf War, his extensive experience in Africa, and also that in 1999 the CIA had Sent Joe on a sensitive mission to Africa on uranium issues'. At the time, Plame embraced the idea, unaware of the damaging events and controversies that would ensue. Plame and the reports officer met with their boss to discuss the proposal. Embrace the idea, their boss, 'filed in putting together a meeting with Joe and the appropriate Agency and State officers'. A week later, Wilson met with 'Iraq / Niger experts from CPD, the DI, and State', and three weeks later in early March of 2002, he began his fact finding mission in Niger. Upon his return nine days later, two 'CIA officers, one of whom was the Reports Officer who had claimed [Wilson]', came to the Wilson's household to debrief Wilson on his trip so that they could immediately write up an intelligence report. As the public now knows, Wilson found no evidence that supported claims that Iraq had sent yellowcake uranium from Niger. Yet despite the refuting claims, the administration still seemed convinced that Iraq was in possession of WMD and posed a serious threat to the nation's security.

Furthermore, in his 2003 January State of the Union speech, President Bush stated 'the British government has learned that Sadam Hussein recently scored significant quantities of uranium from Africa'. The war drums continued to beat on, getting louder with the passing months, and by March 2003, the invasion of Iraq had begun. Needless to say, the Wilson's were bewildered. Both Plame and Wilson had and knew of evidence that condemned much of what the Bush administration had been feeding to the public, especially the claim that Iraq had been seeking uranium from Niger. These sixty words that showed up in the President's speech would have been a major source of content in the following months. How that claim made its way into a presidential speech to the public, was not only bewildering to the Wilson's but to many others in the CIA. As the war lingered on, and WMDs continuously failed to show up, Wilson was prompted to write an article about his trip to Niger. The July 6 New York Times op-ed, titled "What I Did Not Find in Africa", set in motion the firestorm that would soon become the Plame Affair. On July 14, weeks after Wilson's article appeared in the New York Times, The Washington Post ran an article by journalist Robert Novak that claimed, 'Wilson never worked for the CIA, but his wife Valerie Plame, is an agency operative on weapons of mass Destruction. ' After Plame's identity as a CIA agent was released, the backlash began. Accusations of nepotism against Plame were copied thrown around. Wilson was accused of biased and sloppy reporting about his trip to Niger. The toll that the controversial had had on the couple was tremendous. The affair would drag on for four tumultuous years, finally ending in the indictment of I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, who had leaked Plame's name to Robert Novak.

Fair Game highlights one of the many issues the Intelligence Community has had to continue tackle. That issue, politicized intelligence, is one that has been as onerous as it has been persistent; And as disclosed through Fair Game, how easily politicized intelligence can shape even the direst of policy decisions. Another issue, as pointed out by Plame, which the CIA dealt with during this period, was the deep segregated disagreements that existed among the CIA and other Intelligence Agencies. Although genuine discrepancies among the various intelligence agencies are common, in the case of the Iraq War and WMDs, the failure to convey the severity of the disagreements that exist failed to make its way to policy makers. Although Plame cites many of the obstacles the agency faced, she does not recommend any remedies to alleviate or fix the cited issues.

Of the many issues the Intelligence Community has had to continue tackle, since the inception of the IC with the 1947 National Security Act, politicized intelligence has long been a thorn in the side of the IC. Politicalized intelligence can occur in various forms, from policy makers telling analysts what outcomes should be in their finished products, to analysts feeling pressured to give policy makers what they want to hear, and analysts trying to shape out themselves. Although analysts are trained to and take special precaution to avoid politicization of intelligence, it can sometimes be so subtle that it slips under the radar. In the case of the lead up to the Iraq War, it was clear that politicization had made its way into the CIA. As early as 2002, as later reports would reveal, Vice President Cheney and his senior aide, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, made an unpreended number of visits to CIA headquarters.

Speaking with Agency analysts that were working on the Iraq WMD issues, they would often ask questions about Iraq and possible links to Al-Qaeda. Although these multiple visits by the pair were not publicly known until June 2003, senior intelligence officials were quoted as saying that these visits by Cheney had created and environment in which some analysts had been able to make their assessments fit with the Bush Administration's policy objectives … While visits to CIA Headquarters are not unpresented, they are unusual '. Further evidence of the creeping politicization of intelligence continued to occur as the country moved closer to war. The sixteen words previously mentioned about Iraq obtaining uranium in Bush's state of the union speech and how it made its way into his speech befuddled many Agency employees. Despite firm warnings to the White House from the CIA and then DCI George Tenet, against citing the Iraq-Niger claims, those infamous sixteen words somehow managed to find its way into the 2003 State of the Union address. According to Rozen, 'National Security Council Official, Robert Joseph, would go around Tenent to find a CIA department head, WINPAC chief Alan Foley, willing to sign off on the president citing the Niger claim'.

As it became increasingly clear that the nation was headed for war, a sense of polarization within the CIA was also mounting. When Plame joined the agency, there was never mention of political affiliation, but 'with the passage of time, politics began to creep into the environment and one tended to have a general idea of ​​where one's collections stand on the Bush administration'. As polarization and politicization began to slowly see into the Agency, it was not until 2004 when the CIA had really felt the flood of politicization. The 2004 resignations of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet and Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) Jim Pavitt, shocked many agency employees. Although the pair cited a desire to spend more time with their families as the reason for leaving, employees knew there was more to it than that. By September, Bush appointed Porter Goss as the new DCI. Goss, from the beginning was bitterly resented by many Agency employees.

He was criticized for not interacting with senior Agency managers, for spending little time with the heads of foreign intelligence services (all of which the CIA related on for cooperation in counter terrorism and counter proliferation matters); For not being sufficiently engaged in day-to-day activities, and for being unable to master some of the details of operations.

Aftermore, after a memorandum Goss emailed to all CIA employees after the 2004 presidential election, fears of the creeping politicization of the agency were fully realized. As Plame notes, the memo read as follows, 'We support the administration, and its policies, in our work as agency employees … We do not identify with, support, or champion opposition to the Administration or its policies. We provide the intelligence as we see it-and let the facts alone speak to the policy maker '. Although it is clear there was a degree of politicization within the agency during this time, politicization has been a long standing issue. Clearly, with the case of the Iraq War, politicization played a major role. In the past, politicization has always played a part within the intelligence community, but because it has tended to come in more sub forms it is an issue that is often overlooked. Because analysts are trained to detect and avoid politicized intelligence, and the repercussions are severe, the only obvious remedies seem to be to have more intensive training of analysts and employees of the IC on politicization. Another potential remedy is in the choice of DCI; The negative impact Porter Goss had on the CIA was considered.

As Plame notes, 'by January 2005, over twenty senior CIA officials had retired or resigned since Goss became DCI … one thousand years of hard-earned operational experience walked .. when our country's national security needs were greatest.' In an agency as vital as the CIA, a good leader that unites rather than divides is imperative. Furthermore, the role of the DCI should not be attenuated to serving as a puppet to the President's administration.

Another issue the Intelligence Community constantly must deal with is the disagreements among the various agencies on intelligence. One disagreement in particular that erupted between the Department of Energy and the CIA was over the purpose of the aluminum tubes ordered by Iraq in 2001. The Energy Department's situation was that the tubes were used for rocket casings, while one Agency analyst believed the tubes were Used for centrifuge rotors used to separate isotopes to enrich uranium. According to Plame, 'the crime and colossal failure of the intelligence community-and the CIA in particular- was that these deep disagreements were relegated to footnotes in tiny type at the bottom of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)'. Furthermore, the "Presidents Summary", a one page memo, warned the President that there were serious doubts about the intended use of the aluminum tubes. Despite the warnings and doubts expressed by the agency, 'that inconvenient fact did not fit well into their war planning'.

Whether or not, the administration would have heeded the warnings of the CIA had they been clear and direct about the serious doubts that exist between the agencies is unclear but it is obvious the Agency failed to portray the severity of the disagreement and uncertainty that surrounded the Use of the aluminum tubes. This instance highlights two of the obstacles faced by all the Intelligence agencies. Disagreement will almost always exist among the agencies, but given the succinct nature of intelligence reports, many of the existing doubts are often relegated to footnotes. Policy makers simply do not have the time to read long detailed intelligence reports, but sometimes certain issues, such as the decision to go to war, brief reports do not seem sufficient. Although, the newly enacted Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention act of 2004, has allowed for broader cooperation among the agencies, it is reliably early to see if these new implantations will make an impact in rectifying the issue of Agency cooperation and their effects on intelligence reports .

As someone who was betrayed by, not only her country, but the agency which she devoted 20 years too, one would expect Fair Game to be a bitter ridden memoir loaded with ample finger pointing. Though, there is certainly a sense of hurt and betrayal on Plame's part present throughout the book, she takes great care in not portraying herself as a victim at the hands of the US Government. Fair Game highlights many issues that the Intelligence Community, and in particular the CIA, have had to continue tackle. Although she identifies these issues, she does not offer any recommendations or revisions to rectify these problems. Overall, Fair Game provides readers with deaf insight into the workings of the CIA and a deficit appreciation of an agency that far too often falls under public scrutiny.

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